

**MIGRATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT STUDIES LITERATURE:
HAS IT COME OUT OF MARGINALITY?**

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INTRODUCTION

About ten years ago, many people including myself argued that migration, particularly for labour, was receiving insufficient attention in the development studies literature, and in policy making.¹ Much has changed since, with increasing research particularly on international migration (some of it driven by security concerns), a growing number of research and teaching centres and conference that focus often entirely on migration, and at least in the development agencies that I know an increasing recognition that migration is important, and practical responses to this awareness.

The key question that remains, and an appropriate topic for a jubilee conference on development economics, is whether and how this increased recognition of the significance of migration has entered mainstream development studies thinking, including debates on growth and poverty reduction. This question is prompted by two observations. First, despite the flourishing of migration studies, findings particularly regarding *in-country* migration – by far the largest proportion of total movements – often are not reflected in ‘mainstream’ reports on development topics, such as World Development Reports. While data constraints are important, they do not in my view provide sufficient justification for the continued lack of attention.

Second, conclusions about the role of migration in development differ hugely. Recent papers from World Bank staff (both not migration specialists) show the polarisation in the debate. On the one hand there is an assumption that movement of labour – as part of a well-functioning integrated labour market - would lead to the elimination of disparities and equalisation of development. Lant Pritchett in a 2003 conference paper stresses that there are economic, technological and demographic reasons for much larger labour mobility and migration flows across borders, and that “migration is the Millennium Development Goal plan B” (and this is prevented by ideas and perceptions about migration).² While most of world inequality is because of differences *across* countries, international population distribution has failed to adjust.³

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And in one of the first attempts to quantify through cross-country regression the impact of migration and remittances on poverty Adams and Page conclude that an increase of 10 per cent in a country's share of international migrants leads to a 2 per cent decline in \$1 a day poverty, and international remittances too have a strong impact on reducing poverty – though in their own words with heroic assumptions regarding data, and I believe no evidence that the correlation shows causation.⁴

On the other hand, there are both empirical and theoretical objections against the idea that migration would lead to reducing disparities in development – though not necessarily inconsistent with the pro-migration arguments the conclusions tend to differ strongly. David Ellerman at the World Bank stresses that “my impression is that much of the literature is excessively optimistic about the impact of north-south migration on the South.”⁵ For example, temporary labour migration such as by *gastarbeiter* in Germany has not stimulated development in the sending regions. It would not be impossible for such migration to be beneficial, but empirical evidence tends to show, for example, that the ‘best and brightest’ are over-represented among migrants, migration often acts as a safety valve to relieve social pressures, and the developmental impact of remittances has generally not been well established (“increased income is not increased development”). In an overview paper on the relationship between migration and inequality, Black et al. highlight that migration – international migration in particular – carries significant risks and cost, and that migration *does not* always reduce the inequalities as intended by the migrants. Migration and inequality exert mutual influences, the relationship depends strongly on the type of migration (as well as type of inequality), and a hierarchy of migration possibilities and opportunities exists.⁶

What the above suggests – and polarised discussions about ‘brain drain’ (discussed below) suggest the same – is that the observation of Papademetriou and Martin in 1991, Appleyard in the same year, and Sorensen *et al.* ten years later that the migration-development relationship is ‘unsettled’ still appear true, despite the increased attention to migration.⁷

The neglect of labour migration as a central phenomenon in the development process and the polarisation in the debate are, in my view, linked. Many serious studies ignore the existence of migration, possibly seriously influencing the results: for example, two studies on poverty reduction in India have ignored the role of remittances, possibly underestimating the poverty reducing impact of urban-based economic growth.⁸ At the same time, many of the studies that do try to incorporate migration findings do so at the cost of conceptual rigour and/or clarity, for example using ‘stocks’ rather than ‘flows’ of migrants, and in an extreme case using ‘net migration’ (which conceals movements of in- and out-migration, and movement to and fro by the same people), as an indicator for analysing the impact of migration on economic convergence across regions.⁹ While the political nature of the question will provide blocks to reaching any forms of consensus, the disagreements are partly caused by the lack of care in defining the subject.

There is a possible further reason for the continued marginalisation of migration: the relative lack of labour market or employment analysis in development (poverty) studies and policies.¹⁰ Islam for example argued that “rigorous analysis of the role of employment in the linkage between economic growth and poverty reduction appears to be missing.”¹¹ The Millennium Development Goals include no meaningful reference to labour or employment, and certainly compared to the attention that has been paid to poverty data employment data has been neglected, by and large. While discussion of the absence of labour market or employment analysis is beyond the scope of this paper (though in the second part of the paper does discuss labour market analysis in relation to key models on migration), if labour markets and employment are not regularly included in poverty analysis, migration is even less likely to feature in that analysis.

To explore the questions about the role of migration in development studies, and the growth and poverty debates in particular, this paper does two things. The first section will argue that in fact we do know quite a bit about the migration-development relationship, provided we are careful with definitions, and allow for context-specificity to be a key component of our knowledge arsenal. On the basis of this empirical overview, the second part will go back to theoretical models around migration – and in their early incarnations how they were placed in mainstream development thinking – to try to understand why the movement of labour seems to be so badly represented in mainstream development thinking. The concluding section suggests what conditions need to be fulfilled for migration studies to become a more integral part of development thinking.

MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY REDUCTION – WHAT DO WE KNOW ?

On the basis of earlier review,¹² joint work with Ben Rogaly,¹³ as well as a review of recent donor-research on pro-poor growth,¹⁴ this section highlights what we *do* know about migration, and how it links to development. A key part of the argument will be around context specificity. The problem in the migration-development question is not, it will be argued, that we cannot establish links, but that the links are complex, multi-sectoral, assessments dependent on the indicator of well-being chosen, different effects possibly off-set each other, and – crucially – highly context dependent. The section divides the migration-development relationship into a range of inter-actions – increasingly difficult to assess, and it needs to be stressed that the different aspects interact, making quantitative assessments by definition problematic.

a) Who migrates ? and who doesn't ?

Part of the answer to the question of migration-development relationship lies in the answer to the question: who migrates? Characteristics of migrants reflect labour demand structures, and suggest specific way migration affects livelihoods of families, gender, social and economic relations. Labour migration is usually by young able-bodied people. They are often men, but by no means exclusively: gender patterns of

migration relate to a range of political, economic and social conditions. Migrants are often not from the poorest region, usually not the poorest in the areas of origin, and often slightly better-educated or skilled. Further, migration patterns are structured by social divides, such as caste, religion, or ethnicity in Vietnam. Evidence on land-ownership and migration typically varies strongly, and can change over time. Comparisons of incomes/wages with non-migrants in destination areas show a mixed picture and varied picture, with migrants often not far behind the average, making up over time – but an important finding that the diversity of migrants is at least as large as among the non-migrant population.¹⁵

Different migrants also may have different motives.¹⁶ For some it's an accumulation strategy. For the poorest it tends to be a survival strategy, often availing of the least-remunerating opportunities, and evidence exists that migration may reinforce exploitative structures like debt-bondage relationships.¹⁷ For women, savings for dowries is an important motive in western Africa for example, in other cases migration equally may be linked to a particular period in the life-cycle. Thus, there are important variations, and the characteristics depend on economic, political as well as cultural circumstances – changing over time, partly under the influence of migration itself.

An important general finding – for understanding migration-development links – is around the importance of networks, and migration streams. Due to the segmentation of migration streams (and how they 'mature' over time), migrants tend to come from specific areas, and they are not necessarily the poorest from rural areas – particularly not when the migratory jobs are attractive and have higher returns. Better-off people may pave the way for migrants with fewer resources. The edited volume by de Haan and Rogaly (2002) highlights, for various contexts of migration, the importance of social networks, and how social norms co-determine structures of migration, i.e. who migrates, under what circumstances, and potential benefits.

There is some evidence that the poorest, least skilled, least physically capable and without networks tend to migrate less. However, the types of migration the poorest engage in is also least likely to be captured in surveys and census, as may be the case in Vietnam and China where formal registration may determine being captured in surveys, but also in India where for example rural-rural migration is likely to be under-recorded (eg Rogaly et al.) Moreover, as indicated above, for the poorest migration often comes as an extreme survival strategy, suggesting that *when* they migrate, this is likely to be less beneficial than the migration of the better-off.

b) Push and pull – the two legs of the pair of scissors

Pull factors are widely relevant in explaining national as well as international migration movements (and some core of the classic Todaro models – discussed below – remains undisputed). Though there are some doubts about the responsiveness of migrants from poorer areas, and evidence of existence of a 'migration hump',¹⁸ most experience indicates that migrants do move in reaction to newly developing

opportunities. For example, recent panel data analysis using a standard international migration model found robust ‘pull effects’, of improvements of mean income in host countries.¹⁹

There is more controversy about the relationship between migration and development in the ‘catchment’ areas. Earlier migration models identified the less-developed areas as likely candidates for migration, and many development specialists have argued for rural development to reduce migration pressures. But detailed studies show very diverse picture of reasons for out-migration. People from the poorest areas often do not have access to the most rewarding activities, in urban areas or abroad, though they may migrate to activities nearby, for seasonal agricultural and less rewarding work.

Crucially, much evidence shows that development in areas of origin usually goes hand-in-hand with migration. Expectations that rural development will decrease out-migration may be unjustified (though it is likely to change the conditions of migration and composition of migrants): “poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy” (Sorensen et al. 2002). For example, in the Punjab, the Green Revolution occurred simultaneously with both high rates of out-migration as well as in-migration from poorer Indian states, and in China the development of rural enterprises appeared to increase rates of out-migration (except amongst the more educated peasants.²⁰ According to Ron Skeldon, it is impossible to envisage development without migration, and migration *is* development; for example, while Japan was urbanising emigration was *increasing*.²¹

c) Effects of migration

Evidence on effects of migration is controversial – the emphasis above on the closed interlinkage between development and migration already foreshadowed this. With respect to international migration and receiving countries, the consensus seems that immigration has improved economic welfare, including raising tax revenue²² – given restrictive immigration policies this is unsurprising as receiving countries try to allow in only people with skills for which there is an excess demand in the labour market. Most research – at an aggregate levels – seems to contradict the popular belief that immigration contributes to unemployment, or substantial decreases in wages in host societies,²³ though there is of course micro-evidence that employers can attract migrants to reduce wages and bargaining powers of local workers.²⁴

Much less clarity exists about the effect of migration on development of areas of origin, including in agriculture, even though this is perhaps the most relevant question for development studies and policies.²⁵ Very few studies trace the effects of migration and remittances on villages of origin, even in areas with long traditions of out-migration.²⁶ Leaving the question regarding remittances till the next sub-section, we find much contradictory evidence and expectations. There is evidence that migrants contribute to building of schools or other community activities.²⁷ For example, migration can help to alleviate unemployment.²⁸ At the same time, out-migration can lead to a shortage of labour in some contexts,²⁹ perhaps particularly the more skilled

and – almost inevitably - entrepreneurial parts of the population. Field studies centred on villages of migrant origin in four provinces in Jiangsu, Anhui, Sichuan, and Gansu Provinces in China, where out-migration was caused by land scarcity and rising costs of agriculture, showed a shortage of labour caused by migration. Supporting Ellerman's concern, while remittances benefit families, they did not contribute to village development or the establishment and maintenance of village services including those for facilitating agricultural development.³⁰ The World Bank Poverty Assessment for El Salvador highlights that while remittances are important for raising household incomes (and stimulate demand for goods³¹), in the absence of out-migration and remittances families might have increased labour supply in local markets.³²

Not much is known – it seems – about the role of migrants and remittances on enhancing efficiency in agriculture. In England in the 18th century, and possibly elsewhere in Europe, migrants appear to have played important innovative roles.³³ Lakshmanasamy's literature review concludes that migration and remittances modernise the rural sector, both directly and indirectly, through their impact on the production-increasing technological and institutional changes in the agricultural sector.³⁴ Nevertheless, the positive impacts are contingents, and depend on many factors like seasonality of movement, educational levels, length of time spent away, assets, and social structures and institutions allowing women and others to pursue activities previously reserved for men and household heads.

For decades, there has been a particular concern about *brain drain* (usually international migration by the better skilled, but equally important within countries). Recent analysis has started to look at the complexity of the issues involved, though hampered by data availability and quality. Docquier and Rapoport highlight that international migration has become *increasingly* selective. Detrimental effects could include increased international inequality, particularly if migrants are disconnected from those left behind. Beneficial effects could include remittances, return migration, creation of trade and business networks, and incentive effects on human capital formation at home. Cross-country analysis indicates limited evidence that return migration is significant among high skilled, or that they contribute to technology diffusion. They find positive benefits of prospect of migration on human capital formation and GDP growth – leading to a conclusion that “brain drain should not induce developing countries to reduce education expenditures”. However, and crucially, effects are different for different countries, bigger countries with a smaller proportion of migrants being better-off.³⁵

Most analysis of migration is very temporary, focusing on the top of the migration hump. Impacts, however, can be long-term, and fortunes can reverse. One important example of this is the likelihood that migration opportunities decline. There is some literature on the effects of this. On the one hand, areas of origin function as a safety valve, as seen in Indonesia during 1997 and many transition countries.³⁶ Other assessments, for example on the effect of changing South African policies on migrant communities in Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland are less positive Chirwa gives a

generally optimistic view about the effects of oscillating labour migration in the region, and describes the reasons for success and failure in the use of returns from migration: the “social, economic, as well as political disruptions caused by this process are just too great for the weak economies and fragile political structures of the labor-supplying countries and local communities to effectively handle.”³⁷ Leliveld describes the effects of declining migration on households in rural Swaziland: employment possibilities in Swaziland are limited, and relatively young households, with few working members, and a weak economic position are among the most vulnerable in this context.³⁸ Also, there is a considerable literature on the negative effects of sudden barriers to international migration, such as during the Gulf War which had an enormous impact on sending countries.³⁹

d) Remittances: amounts and impact

Central in much of the thinking on impact of migration has been the question of remittances. It is generally recognised that data are difficult to interpret, perhaps particularly where restrictions on transfers exist official data are likely to imply underreporting (in-kind transfers and gifts are also significant). In an increasing number of household surveys remittances are captured (though in expenditure surveys remittances will be implicit), allowing in my view more analysis than assumed by many. As we will see later, economic theories tend to have rather different interpretations of remittances (insurance, bequest), as they have of migration more generally.

There is a large amount of literature on remittances: conclusions about both amounts and uses differ.⁴⁰ I focus here on internal migration, the more difficult question. Reardon's overview of the importance of the rural non-farm income in Africa (covering 25 case studies) is helpful to give an idea of magnitude, and how this differs across locations. This showed that on average 45 per cent of total rural income was non-farm, differing between 22 and 93 per cent. In areas not close to major cities, migration earnings constituted 20% of total *non-farm earnings*, whereas it was as high as 75% in areas close to major cities.⁴¹

More recent studies exist,⁴² including Ellis and Freeman's livelihood study in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi.⁴³ They stress that reduction of dependence on agriculture is a key way out of poverty. In Tanzania for example about half of household's income derives from agriculture (less so for better-off) and of the other half by far the 36 per cent was non-farm income, 11 per cent by wages, and a mere 4 per cent transfers (slightly higher for worse-off). A similar small importance of migration/transfers (and higher for poorer) was found in Uganda.⁴⁴

So roughly, across Africa about a quarter of total rural incomes may be derived from migration, but with wide variations, greatly depending on locations, and with different importance for different socio-economic groups.

Apart from the uncertainty in estimates of remittances, assessments of impact need to be sensitive to the complexity in which this is embedded. First, they need to take account of the fact that this counts only successful migration, and there is a possibility that many migrants have *not* remitted despite having invested heavily. Second, data on remittances need to take account of reverse flows,⁴⁵ of initial investment, but also for example food from villages of origin to cities. Third, as highlighted already in the discussion on brain drain, from a home country public policy perspective remittances need to be off-set against the (public) investment in education and other.⁴⁶

Evaluation of impact of remittances seems to have shifted – on the whole – since the 1970s, when there was much stress on the ‘conspicuous consumption’ of migrants and their relatives, towards more positive views, focusing, for example, upon the conditions needed to secure the investment of remittances, and internationally the emphasis of increasing remittances and how they have far outstripped official aid. Authors that have emphasised the lack of productive investment include Oberai and Singh who concluded that only 6 per cent of remittances flowing into the Indian Punjab were used for productive investment (though remittances did improve distribution of income).⁴⁷ On the other hand, literature that emphasises productive investments include Papademetriou and Martin (1991) and various publications by Richard Adams.⁴⁸ Durand *et al.* show income from migration stimulates economic activity, both directly and indirectly, and that it leads to significantly higher levels of employment, investment, and income.⁴⁹ Finally, it needs pointing out that even very small amounts of remittances can be vital for poor people, including their food security.⁵⁰

Thus, levels of remittances vary widely - depending on various factors such as accessibility of the home village, employment opportunities, costs of living, ease of remitting, and the ‘orientation’ of the migrant - and estimates are usually unreliable. Evidence on the way remittances are used also shows diversity, and can be modelled in rather different ways. There is no doubt that remittances can have negative and positive consequences - evidence suggests that the way remittances are used depends on the form of migration, the characteristics of the migrants and those who stay behind, and conditions for use of remittances and returning migrants. This finally points to one of the complexities of understanding impact of migration: the conditions that make remittances be helpful for development or poverty reduction are generally the same conditions that made migrants leave in the first place.⁵¹

e) Inequality back on the agenda – and what do we know about migration

The ‘reappearance’ of inequality in the development debate should give some new impetus to the research on migration, as it already has with respect to international migration. As emphasised by Pritchett, migration has to have an impact on migration, and have to reduce overall income inequality. However, assessments of this, too are very varied, and are very dependent on unit and indicator of analysis (Black et al 2004).

The Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth programme highlights a key dilemma in assessing migration: while it generally helps to reduce poverty and increase income of the poor, migration and remittances also lead to increased inequality within countries. A similar theme was highlighted in Indian Village Studies project in the 1970s, which showed rural-urban migration did not tend to equalise incomes, *between* or *within* regions: the selective nature of migration, providing higher returns to the better-off and better-educated, prevents equalisation within areas of origin; there are costs and barriers associated with migration, including access to information about opportunities, which tends to steer the gains of migration to the rich; absence of the most productive household members leads to a lowering of labour-intensity; the volume of net remittances was usually low; and return migrants are likely to be the old, sick, and unsuccessful, and skills brought back unlikely to be of much help.⁵² Islam (1991) concluded that the negative effects of migration to the Gulf from villages in Chittagong in Bangladesh outweighed positive ones: land became concentrated in the hand of migrant families, who turned into non-farmers, which contributed to a decrease in production. Land prices went up, and so did the cost of labour, though not so high as to lead to labour saving in agriculture.

But here too, generalisations appear meaningless. Some form of migration lead to equalising income within regions, though not necessarily between sending and receiving regions. In some cases migration increases income inequality, in some cases it lowers it, this relationship may change over time as has been shown in Mexico for example. The unit of analysis matters, too, as increased male income does not necessarily translate into increased well-being of women. While in some cases migration and remittances have led to development, in other cases it has not. Again, the key issue appears to be not migration itself but the condition under which people leave and conditions for development generally which determine the impact of migration.

h) concluding

There is a point to the annoying complexity or diversity highlighted above (still only a very selective overview of the literature): it appears to me that the value of generalising about ‘migrants’, ‘migration’, and its impact is very limited. Possibly, the number of people who move is as large as those who do not, and the conditions under which they do move are as diverse as the conditions under which people stay where they are. Few straightforward conclusions or easy generalisations emerge, though some conclusions can be drawn.

First, most analysts probably tend to agree that migration emerges out of differences in opportunity, and that workers and labour markets generally are responsive to opportunities (though there will be degrees of integration of labour markets – one of the problems of migration studies is that they focus on migrants and less on the wider environment). The ‘migration optimists’ tend to argue that where migration does not lead to reduction in disparities, this tends to be due to barriers for migrants, such as international borders. The ‘migration pessimist’ emphasise that there is very little

empirical evidence that shows that migration does in fact lead to reduction in disparities. Importantly, migration will have different impacts in different contexts, and that while the classic Harris-Todaro models was not wrong in terms of predicting a transfer of labour from rural to urban areas, they may have been optimistic – at least implicitly – about the speed with which this would occur, and almost certainly wrong in the assumption that the migration process amounts to a lottery.

The evidence on remittances also show that context matters greatly, in both their amount and use. I think that on balance the literature supports Ellerman's view, that the migration optimists tend to ignore the evidence on first-round effects looking for second- and third-order effects, and I have stressed that an assessment of impact of migration and remittances need to be seen in context of wider environment in which migration operates, and address contradictory and off-setting factors. The optimist and pessimist conclusions are not necessarily incompatible: the point is that conditions and context seem crucial for the chances that migration/remittances end up stimulating development (in areas of origin). This truism may be of key relevance for the chances that migration leads to a reduction in disparities, as the same absent conditions that would make remittances lead to development were the reasons migrants left in the first place.

THEORISING MIGRATION – WHAT GOOD HAS THIS DONE ?

Against this review of the empirical complexity of characteristics, causes and consequences of migration, this second part of the paper will review the models in which migration has been analysed. Like the empirical description, this will highlight a diversity in and controversy over approaches, again based on earlier work, but now trying to answer the question – very tentatively – how different approaches make it more or less likely that migration can be understood as an integral and often central part of development processes, and what the policy implications of the different approaches are.

a) Job lottery, individual motives, but only during 'transition'

While earlier theorising of migration tried to explain volumes of migration, e.g., by reference to distance, probably the most important theoretical starting point for migration studies since the 1970s has been the model describes by Harris and Todaro in the American Economic Review.⁵³ In this, a prospective migrant is expected to weigh the difference between the expected earnings from formal sector urban employment, an initial period of informal sector employment, and the expected earnings in the village. While criticised by many, empirical analyses have shown that the model has certain predictive value. Lucas,⁵⁴ Hatton and Williamson,⁵⁵ and Larson and Mundlak⁵⁶ all in one way or the other have re-affirmed the validity of the model. More recently, Lucas provides a theoretical model of rural-urban migration based on Todaro-Harris, emphasising the increasing skill levels in urban areas, and widening gap with agricultural workers.⁵⁷

It may be worth pausing at this dualistic model (two- or three sector), and the role that dualistic thinking has had in the development studies literature. While its historical origins have been traced to the colonial Dutch economist Boeke,⁵⁸ the dualistic model draws heavily on the surplus-labour model developed by Lewis.⁵⁹ With a strong focus on modernisation and agricultural transformation (perhaps foreshadowing the undue emphasis on ‘formal’ employment),⁶⁰ Lewis predicted non-agricultural employment to increase without real wages rising initially, until surplus labour was absorbed. Well-functioning labour markets were thought to be key to this process of transformation.

This provides some clue to the question why the Todaro and Lewis type of migration and labour market analysis has had limited value for the development debate. While it may help in analysing labour market developments in processes of structural (rural-urban, industrial) transformation, a priori it seems of limited value outside the contexts of such structural transformations. This seems important for four, related, sets of reasons. First, the segmented market models emphasised by Todaro and others have apparent relevance in describing empirical realities that show clearly diverging wage rates in those different sectors.⁶¹ But it may have contributed to *ignoring* forms of migration that are at least as important as those related to ‘modernisation’, particularly (intra-sectoral) rural-rural migration which according to various observers constitutes quantitatively most important form of migration in countries like India.

Second, it appears to have led to a *conceptualisation of labour markets* that is restricted to – or at least focusing on – moves out of agriculture,⁶² reducing the relevance of it to discussions in Africa for example.⁶³

Third, the conceptualisation as clearly differentiated markets makes it difficult to take account of connections of labour markets to for example product or output markets which tends to be of central importance for small traders and producers.⁶⁴

Finally, while the 1960s discussions and theories were situated in discussions of structural changes, focus of Todaro-type of analysis has been on individual incentives (and remittances): this makes it suitable for inclusion in individualistic types of poverty analysis that has prevailed, but has arguable removed it from its origin in debates on economic and societal transformations.⁶⁵

b) Beyond individual motives – but beyond ‘rationality’?

At least two sets of theoretical innovations – partly related, both known under the term new economics of migration – have taken migration studies beyond the individual incentives central to the Todaro type of models: one that has taken households rather than individuals as unit of analysis, the other which has focused on migration as over-coming market imperfections.

A fairly recent development in the migration literature has been the emphasis on family and family strategies as crucial elements in migration decisions. Whereas the Todaro-type of models focus on the individuals as rational actors, the ‘new economics of migration’ emphasise the family as unit of analysis: “even though the entities that engage in migration are often individual agents, there is more to labor migration than an individualistic optimizing behavior. Migration by one person can be due to, fully consistent with, or undertaken by a group of persons, such as the family.”⁶⁶ The family is conceptualised as a coalition *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world, family members share costs of and rewards of migration. Consistent with more recent ‘livelihood’ approaches, migration is seen as a form of portfolio diversification by families, in which they enter into chosen contractual arrangements, and remittances exemplify the ‘inter-temporal contractual arrangement’ between migrant and family, with families investing in migrants, migrants in families, and both expecting returns from that.⁶⁷

Subsequent economic models to explain remittance behaviour have been of two types.⁶⁸ First, building on the work of Rosenzweig and others, models focus on insurance contracts between the migrant and the household left behind, as a means of coping with household risk, and on migration and remittances as a form of portfolio diversification (options to receive remittances are weighed against the returns from local sources of income). The second type of model builds on literature around bequest motive: remittances as investments in household assets that the migrant will later inherit, which is supported by analysis of difference in remittance behaviour between men and women (caused by gender-differentiated inheritance rules).

Using household rather than individuals as the central unit of analysis appears appropriate, for a number of reasons. First, it sits much more comfortably with much sociological and anthropological (and ‘livelihoods’) analysis – like Krokfors concept of ‘multi-active households’,⁶⁹ the emphasis in families investing in education for migration to the formal urban sector,⁷⁰ and for example Van Velsen’s analysis of urban migrants’ awareness of the temporary nature of their urban existence⁷¹ - though of course with less emphasis on context specific and cultural factors determining household forms and interactions, and possibly biased towards the unitary household model criticised by feminist authors.⁷² Second, it is much better placed to take account of the fact that much if not most migration is ‘circular’ - i.e. constituting continued interactions with areas of origins rather than a one-way and one-off move – taking it out of the (implicit) emphasis on ‘transition’ in the rural-urban model of Todaro. Third, in principle it appears that a focus on households makes it easier to incorporate findings into the dominant form of poverty analysis, with its focus on households, albeit with an inevitable sedentary bias.

However, while its unit of analysis is more promising than that of the individual in the job lottery, the new economics remains firmly grounded in a functionalistic and individualistic economic framework. Migration is seen primarily in terms of economic function (contractual arrangements) within the household,⁷³ without much attention to the ‘non-economic’ factors that drive such decisions, or the cultural determinant of household forms themselves, despite the fact that household forms and

composition are key to structuring migration processes (and vice versa).⁷⁴ Further, migration is seen as solutions to market failures, such as the absence of access to insurance or for example to investment in education: while rightly broadening the focus from the simple job-wage consideration in the Todaro model, this emphasises a functionality of migration that can provide only a very partial explanation of movements of people, and has little to say about the multiple and bi-directional links of migration and remittances to broader processes of development.

c) The structuration of migration

For a broader understanding of migration and how it links to development processes we have to move largely – it seems – outside the economics literature. Alternative conceptualisations are manifold, of course, and here I stress merely the literature that emphasises the social institutions structuring migration, and the critical literature that has linked migration to capitalist and colonial development.

There is a great amount of literature that emphasises the way migration and social and other institutions are linked.⁷⁵ Complementing migration models like Todaro's this emphasises the continuity, in terms of social institutions, that marks migration processes, and sees migration decisions as part of continuing efforts, consistent with traditional values (though sometimes 'unravelling social fabric'⁷⁶), to solve recurrent problems, often but not only related to resource scarcity. Migration processes are seen as 'embedded' in social relations.⁷⁷ Gender analysis has of course contributed greatly, as indicated above in the discussion on household models of migration, not only in understanding differentiated motivations for and impacts of migration, but also more broadly in the way migration processes are structured, emphasising power and exploitation: "gender is an essential tool for unpicking the migration process."⁷⁸ Finally, research focusing on migrant networks has played a very important role in helping to see movements of people as part, not only of 'traditions of migration' and interpreted in a 'cumulative migration theory',⁷⁹ but also wider processes of social and economic development.⁸⁰

It seems that most of the literature that has made the migration-development links central, has been from a critical, often Marxist perspective. Southern African academics in particular have been engaged in continued debate about migration and its relations with apartheid, uneven capitalist development, and rural change. Partly in the context of urbanisation and the informal sector,⁸¹ but also with focus on movement of migrant workers within rural areas,⁸² and building on historical analysis,⁸³ these critical studies explicitly challenged the individualistic assumptions underlying models like Todaro's, and have described migration as an inevitable part of transition towards or development of capitalism. Similarly, international migration and remittances have been conceptualised in the context of advantages for global capital and richer nations.⁸⁴

d) Beyond the differences?

A fairly neutral scan of the different theories of migration suggests as much complementarity as differences. Clearly, individual motives and push-pull considerations matter, as do household of which migrants are a part. Social network and institution similarly cannot be ignored in understanding processes and outcomes of migration, and particularly historical studies have shown very clearly how many migration streams were created in the interest of capital and colonial powers – and in a large number of cases the effects of these can still be seen (of course, structures of European immigration for example still are determined by the historical experiences of colonialisms, and the active recruitment policies during the economic booms of the 1960s). The problem, perhaps, is not so much in what is known about migration, but that dominant debates do not fully appreciate the importance of insights from different historical traditions, and the different policy implications that (might) follow.

CONCLUDING: CAN MIGRATION STUDIES COME OUT OF MARGINALITY ?

The key question for this paper is not whether there are enough *studies* on migration: clearly, enormous amounts of literature have been produced, with an apparent upsurge of studies during the last few years, particularly related to international migration, but also – for example in the context of livelihoods research – on migration within countries.

Also, the key question is not whether we *know enough* about migration. Again, there is no shortage of knowledge about what drives migration, and whether migrants are able to succeed – though the review in the first part of this paper puts a strong emphasis on context specificity, and suggests that there is a specific gap with respect to understanding the *impact on* or (more appropriately) *inter-relationship with* broader development processes in areas of origin.

The key question that remains, and which relates closely to this specific gap in the literature, is whether migration studies have become an integral part of the understanding of development processes, including ‘growth’ and ‘poverty reduction’. Though the burden of proof remains, my impression is that it remains difficult to integrate an understanding of mobility, labour migration in particular, in mainstream development studies texts.

To be fair, the reasons for this are manifold, and in conclusion I suggest that it may be worth thinking of these barriers under the following headings or reasons (not necessarily related). First, it is important to understand the political-economy of research itself – though this would take us well beyond the scope of the current paper. Interest in migration is to a great extent politically driven, sometime with a main urge to reduce migration, sometimes to revalue the contribution of migration, recently of course also in the context of security concerns. I suggest that the political motivation

provides a partial explanation for both the emphasis on international migration, and the isolation of the study of migration from that of broader development processes.

Second, apart from the fact that generalisations about migration are difficult to arrive at, data problems and scarcity continues to hamper understanding of migration, particularly its links to development in a broader sense. Though more analysis is possible,⁸⁵ and more data (including on national migration) available than often assumed, quantitative analysis in particular is complicated by movement of people, and for example more panel data are required than presently available in development studies.⁸⁶ As discussed above, it is crucial also to highlight the complexity of ‘impact of’ remittances on development, including possible under-recording of most vulnerable forms of migration, and the counter-factual of not migration. Conversely, much migration analysis does exactly that, studying the movement of people and/or remittances, but often as isolated phenomena, rather than as integral parts of social and economic development. In particular, and perhaps reflecting the same political determination highlighted above, migration studies still tends to neglect the impact of migration on sending regions and countries.

A third point relates to the complexity of migration, in the sense that – as argued above – it appears impossible and perhaps even meaningless to formulate generalisations about impacts of migration, for example on inequality, or development in areas of origin. This is not as benign as an emphasis on ‘context specificity’ suggests. What this highlights is exactly the need to see migration as an integral part of wider development processes, as it appears that the conditions and policies that make migration and remittances successful (eg as highlighted in discussion of ‘brain drain’) appear to be general conditions that make development and growth likely (and the same issues that often made migrants leave in the first place). Processes of migration, thus, can be seen as markers of wider development processes – but only as they are understood as an integral part of those rather than (as is more common) isolated phenomena.

Fourth, and discussed in the second main part of this paper, many of the theoretical frameworks under which much migration analysis has been carried out, arguably, have hampered the understanding of migration as part of wider development processes. While household models of migration appear an appropriate extension of the models focusing on individuals (and seem to fit in well with the dominant forms of poverty analysis), highlighting the ‘circular’ nature of much migration, they continue to isolate households and their migration movements from wider processes of development, under-estimating the importance of bi-directional linkages.

Some of the anthropological literature – eg on Southern Africa – have portrayed much richer pictures of this complexity, and it seems important to ensure that these approaches inform more strongly our understanding of the role of migration. Similarly, the critical migration literature has highlighted many aspects of political economy that are key to understanding migration. However, and as a fifth possible reason for the marginality of migration analysis, the predominant development debate

does often not draw sufficiently on insights from these disciplines, hence unintentionally further undermining the possibility of enriching understanding of development process by migration analysis.

Much of this may not come as a surprise, at present. But it may well have been a big surprise for the classical development thinkers around the 1950s, for whom labour mobility was considered a key part of processes of modernisation. But in these classics, labour markets too were very important, and much of the recent development debate seems to have ignored the importance of labour markets and employment (eg highlighted by the absence of meaningful indicators in the MDGs). Moreover, the classics were rich in institutional details, and as argued above an institutional understanding of migration appears key to ensuring that the role of migration can be seen as part of wider development processes, and for example to heed Ellerman's warning regarding conflating remittances with development.

Notes and References

¹ See for example C. McDowell and A. de Haan, 'Migration and Sustainable Livelihoods: a Critical Review of the Literature', IDS Working Paper No 65, 1997/98.

² Pritchett, L., 'The Future of Migration: Irresistible Forces meet Immovable Ideas', paper presented to The Future of Globalization, Conference at Yale University, October 2003; see also Pritchett's (who wrote on migration while at the Kennedy School), 'Boom Towns and Ghost Countries: Geography, Agglomeration, and Population Mobility', Mimeo, 2004, emphasising the dominance of movement within countries.

³ Moses and Letnes estimate through an applied equilibrium model that liberalisation of international migration restrictions, resulting in a 10% increase in international migration would lead to an efficiency gain of US\$774 billion – but in their own view with very problematic assumptions and other shortcomings; Moses, J.W. and B. Letnes, 2004, The Economic Costs to International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion, *World Development*, Vol.32, No.10, pp.1609-26.

⁴ R. H Adams and J. Page, International Migration, Remittances and Poverty in Developing Countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3179, December 2003; this further points at the importance of distance on international migration, and the higher proportion of migrants in middle-income countries.

⁵ Ellerman, D., 'Policy Research on Migration and Development', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3117, August 2003.

⁶ Black, R., C. Natali, J. Skinner, 'Migration and Inequality', Background Paper for the 2006 World Development Report, Sussex, November 2004.

⁷ Papademetriou, D.G. and P.L. Martin, eds., 1991, *The Unsettled Relationship: Labour Migration and Economic Development*, New York: Greenwood; R Appleyard, *International Migration: Challenge for the Nineties*, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 1991; Sorensen, N., N. Van Hear, P. Engberg-Pedersen, 'The Migration-Development Nexus Evidence and Policy Option. State of the Art Overview', Centre for Development Research, Working Paper 02.6, Copenhagen, 2002.

⁸ Ravallion and Datt, 19XX. T. Besley, R. Burgess, and B. Esteve-Volart 'Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth: A Case Study on India', paper was prepared in the context of the "Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth" work program, 2004.

⁹ Cashin, P. and R. Sahay, 'Internal Migration, Centre-State Grants, and Economic Growth in the States of India', *IMF Staff Papers*, Vol.43, No.1, 1996.

¹⁰ Discussion of this subject here is largely based on recent discussions with representatives of WIEGO, 'Informal Labour Markets and Pro-Poor Growth', 21-23 March 2005.

¹¹ R Islam, 'The Nexus of Economic Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis', Issues in Employment and Poverty, Discussion Paper 14, ILO 2004.

¹² A. de Haan, Livelihoods and Poverty: the Role of Migration. A Critical Review of the Migration, *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.36, No.2, December 1999, pp.1-47.

¹³ A. de Haan and Ben Rogaly, eds, *Labour Mobility and Rural Society*, Frank Cass, London, 2002.

¹⁴ DFID, Policy Division, Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/propoorgrowthcasestudies.asp>. Some of the case studies in this research programme provided much information about migration, and the synthesis work asked the question about the role of processes of growth and particularly increasing inequality. I have also benefited from the various papers commissioned in the preparation of the DFID migration strategy.

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¹⁶ As research on Ghana shows, while half of the population may be categorised as migrant, reasons are very diverse, and only a small part of this is directly related to motives to find work. In India the largest proportion of migration (particularly short-distance) as registered in the Census may be for marriage: almost by definition, almost all women move to the house of their husband.

¹⁷ Mosse 2002 for western India

¹⁸ P Martin 1997

¹⁹ Anna Maria Mayda, *International Migration: A Panel data Analysis of Economic and Non-Economic Determinants*, IZA DP No.1590 (www.iza.org); further factors affecting migration rates inequality in origin and destination, geographical, cultural, and demographic factors, and migration policies. The theoretical model referred to is from Clark, Hatton and Williamson, on US immigrants.

²⁰ Liang, Z., and M.J.White, 'Market Transition, Government Policies, and Interprovincial Migration in China: 1983-1988', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.45 No.2,1997, pp.321-339.

²¹ Skeldon, Ronald, *Migration and Development. A Global Perspective*, Harlow: Longman, 1997.

²² A study in the UK on the impact of immigration on public finances showed a growing contribution (amounting to 10 percent by 2003-04), at a substantially higher rate than the UK-born population, and a greater net contributor; D. Sriskandarajah, L. Cooley and H. Reed, *Paying Their Way. The Fiscal Contribution of Immigrants in the UK*, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, www.ippr.org, April 2005.

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²⁴ For example, for western India, Jan Breman, *Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers: Rural Labour Circulation and Capitalist Production in West India*, Oxford University Press, 1985; Research by Ben Rogaly et al.

²⁵ Much emphasis has been on 'integration' of migrants, and impact on 'host communities'. A recent issue of *International Migration Review* (Fall 2004) for example on conceptual development in international migration studies does not pay any attention to the impact on sending areas.

²⁶ A de Haan, 'Migration and Livelihoods in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of Bihar, India', *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.38, No.5, June 2002, pp.115-42.

²⁷ Russell, S.S., K. Jacobsen, and WD. Stanley (1990). *International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2 Vols., World Bank Discussion Papers, 101 and 102, Africa Technical Department Series, Washington, p.63.

²⁸ B. Ghosh, B. 'Migration-Development Linkages: Some Specific Issues and Practical Policy Measures', *International Migration*, Vol.30, No.3/4, 1992, pp. 423-52.

²⁹ In the labour-scarce west Africa environment, absence of able-bodied men was keenly felt and led to a 'labour gap', women were working longer and harder in the compound's communal fields, and had less time to work their own land; Rosalind David, *Changing Places: Women, Resource Management and Migration in the Sahel*, London: SOS Sahel, 1995.

³⁰ E.J. Croll and Huang Ping, 'Migration For and Against Agriculture in Eight Chinese Villages', *The China Quarterly*, 1997, pp.128-46.

³¹ In other contexts, the possibility of inflationary impact has been emphasised; Amjad, Rashid (1989). 'Economic Impact of Migration to the Middle East on the Major Asian Labour Sending Countries - An Overview', in: R. Amjad, ed., *To the Gulf and Back. Studies on the Economic Impact of Asian Labour Migration*, Geneva: UNDP/ILO, pp.1-27.

³² Quoted in the OPG study José Silvério Marquez, *Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth. A Country Case Study on El Salvador*, November 2004.

³³ Thirsk, J. 'Rural Migration in England: The Long Historical Perspective', in: Mollett, J.A., ed., *Migrants in Agricultural Development. A Study of Intrarural Migration*, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991, pp.32-55.

³⁴ Lakshmansamy, T., 'Family Survival Strategy and Migration: An Analysis of Returns to Migration', *The Indian Journal of Social Work*, Vol.51, No.3, 1990, pp.473-85 (in this, he notes that according to Eames, 12 per cent of the respondents' remittances were used to buy bullocks and 'to aid agriculture'; Oberai and Singh showed that a significant proportion of remittances were used for agricultural production; and Brammer described how immigrants to Dinajpur introduced double cropping).

- ³⁵ Docquier, F., and H. Rapoport, 2004?, *Skilled Migration: The Perspective of Developing Countries*, CADRE/IZA.
- ³⁶ For example, the OPPG case study on Romania.
- ³⁷ Chirwa, Wiseman Chijera, "No TEBA ... Forget TEBA": The Plight of Malawian Ex-migrant Workers to South Africa, 1988-1994', *International Migration Review*, Vol.31, No.3, 1997, p. 650.
- ³⁸ Leliveld, A., 'The Effects of Restrictive South African Migrant Labour Policy on the Survival of Rural Households in Southern Africa: A Case Study from Rural Swaziland', *World Development*, Vol.25, No.11, 1997, pp.1839-49.
- ³⁹ Connell, J. and J. Wang, 'Distant Victims?: The Impact of the Gulf War on international Migration to the Middle East from Asia', in: A.K. Tripathi and V.B. Bhatt, *Changing Environmental Ideologies*, New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1992, pp.131-64; Addleton, J. 'The Impact of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances in Asia and the Middle East', *International Migration*, Vol.29, No.4, 1991, pp.509-26.
- ⁴⁰ For example, Adepoju and Mbugua (1997: 54) note that African migrants often remit up to 60 per cent of their incomes, though Findley (1997: 130) in the same volume quotes research showing that migrants remit between 5 and 15 per cent of their income. Adepoju, A and W. Mbugua, 'The African Family: An Overview of Changing Forms', pp.41-59; and Findley, S., 'Migration and Family Interactions in Africa', pp.109-38, in Adepoju, A., ed., *Family, Population and Development in Africa*, London: Zed Books, 1997.
- ⁴¹ Th. Reardon, 'Using Evidence of Household Income Diversification to Inform Study of the Rural Nonfarm Labor Market in Africa', *World Development*, Vol.25, No.5, 1997, pp.735-47.
- ⁴² Eg ODI India livelihood study
- ⁴³ Ellis and Freeman 2004
- ⁴⁴ Ellis and Bahigwa 2003
- ⁴⁵ Lipton ; Findley 1997.
- ⁴⁶ To take an example close to home: given that my education in the Netherlands may have cost the tax payer about \$100,000, it would take a me (who falls in the category of not remitting) a long time before my remittances would become a *net* gain.
- ⁴⁷ Oberai, A. and H.K. Singh, 'Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a Case study in the Indian Punjab', *International Labour Review*, Vol.119 No.2, 1980, pp. 229-41; also Islam, M.D., 'Labour Migration and Development: A Case Study of a Rural Community in Bangladesh', *Bangladesh Journal of Political Economy*, Vol.11, No.2B, 1991, pp.570-87; Roberts, K.D., 'China's "Tidal Wave" of Migrant Labour: What Can We Learn From Mexican Undocumented Migration to the United States?', *International Migration Review*, Vol.31, No.2, 1997, pp.249-93.
- ⁴⁸ R.H. Adams, 'The Economic Uses and Impact of International Remittances in Rural Egypt', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.39, No.4, 1991, pp.695-722; 'Remittances, Inequality and Asset Accumulation: the Case of Rural Pakistan', in: D. O'Connor and L. Farsakh, *Development Strategy, Employment and Migration*, OECD, 1996, pp.149-70; 'Remittances, Investment, and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1998, pp.155-73.
- ⁴⁹ Durand, J., W. Kandel, E.A. Parrado, and D.S. Massey, 'International Migration and Development in Mexican Communities', *Demography*, Vol.33, No.2, 1996, pp.249-64; Durand, J., E.A. Parado, D.S. Massey, 'Migradollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case', *International Migration Review*, Vol.30, No.2, 1996, pp.423-44.
- ⁵⁰ David (1995). Knowles and Anker noted that remittances are more important for poorer than richer households in Kenya – even if the rich received more; Knowles, A.C., and R. Anker, 'An Analysis of Income Transfers in a Developing Country', *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 8, 1981, pp.205-26.
- ⁵¹ The proportion of Taiwanese and Korean science PhDs trained in the US that *returned* to their home country increased significantly with the impressive growth in their home countries (quoted in Docquier and Rapoport 2004: 21).
- ⁵² Lipton 1982;
- ⁵³ Harris, J., and M.P. Todaro, 'Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two Sector Analysis', *American Economic Review*, 60, 1970, pp.126-42; Todaro, M.P. 'A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries', *The American Economic Review*, 59, 1969, pp.138-49.
- ⁵⁴ Quoted in Ghatak, A., P. Levine, S. Wheatley Price, 'Migration Theories and Evidence: An Assessment', *Journal of Economic Surveys*, Vol.10, No.2, 1996, pp.159-98.

- ⁵⁵ Hatton, T.J., and J.G. Williamson, 'What Explains Wage Gaps between Farm and City? Exploring the Todaro Model with American Evidence, 1890-1941', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.40, No.2, 1992, pp.267-94.
- ⁵⁶ Larson, D. and Y. Mundlak, 'On the Intersectoral Migration of Agricultural Labour', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.45, No.2, 1997, pp.295-319.
- ⁵⁷ Lucas, R.E., 2002, Life Earnings and Rural-Urban Migration, Mimeo. In more recent work, Lucas four sector model
- ⁵⁸ Jan Breman,
- ⁵⁹ A Lewis, 1954, also Fei and Ranis 1964
- ⁶⁰ Also Kuznets 1966 and the role of rising inequality in this structural transformation. Also, Zelinsky's transition model that linked modernisation to changes in patterns of migration; Sledon 1997, p. 31 ff.
- ⁶¹ OPPG vietnam
- ⁶² This can be reflected in confusing terminology of 'mobility', which can refer to sectoral mobility *in terms of* sectoral change, and not just human mobility.
- ⁶³ World Bank stocktake
- ⁶⁴ Jennifer Leavy, pers. comm.; her doctoral research in Northern Province, Zambia highlights both the inter-related nature of different types of markets, and the ways markets are embedded in personal relations.
- ⁶⁵ According to Rodgers, the classic development literature of Arthur Lewis and Gunnar Myrdal was rich in institutional detail; his article in 1996 and the volume he and others brought together provides a range of research priorities around labour institutions, in macro- and micro-economics, labour market structure, mobilisation of labour, wage setting institutions, and agrarian systems; Gerry Rodgers, 'Labour Institutions and Economic Development: Issues and Methods', in G. Rodgers, K. Foti, L. Lauridsen, *The Institutional Approach to Labour and Development*, EADI Book Series 17, Frank Cass, London, 1996.
- ⁶⁶ O. Stark, *The Migration of Labour*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991, p.3.
- ⁶⁷ Dustmann presents a life-cycle model to compare the decisions of a migrant about consumption and time abroad under certainty and uncertainty in the host and home countries; C. Dustmann, 'Return Migration, Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings', *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol.52 No.2, 1997, pp.295-316.
- ⁶⁸ de la Brière, B., A. de Janvry, S. Lambert, and E. Sadoulet, 1997, 'Why Do Migrants Remit? An Analysis for the Dominican Sierra', IFPRI, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division, Discussion Paper No.37.
- ⁶⁹ Krokfors, C, 'Poverty, Environmental Stress and Culture as Factors in African Migrations', in: Baker, J. and Akin Aina, T., eds., *The Migration Experience in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Sweden, 1995, pp.54-64.
- ⁷⁰ Adepoju, A and W. Mbugua, 'The African Family: An Overview of Changing Forms', in: Adepoju, A., ed., *Family, Population and Development in Africa*, Zed Books, London, p.54.
- ⁷¹ J. van Velsen, 'Labour Migration as a Positive Factor in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1959, Vol.8 No.2.
- ⁷² But see de la Briere, op cit., 1997, which emphasises heterogeneity in explaining remittances, differences between male and female Dominican migrants to the US, and the differences in inheritance rules to explain this. The same theme has been studied Filipino/a migrants, with the surprising conclusion that men send more money back than women, by M. Semyonov and A. Gorodzeisky, 'Labor Migration, Remittances and Household Income: A Comparison Between Filipino and Filipina Overseas Workers', *International Migration Review*, Vol.34, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.45-68.
- ⁷³ Stark's analysis of the role of urban-rural remittances in rural development sets out how migration by-passes credit and insurance markets, facilitating surplus accumulation and diversification of income sources; Stark, Oded, 'On the Role of Urban-Rural Remittances in Rural Development', *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.16 No.3, 1980, pp.369-374.
- ⁷⁴ This is a theme I tried to develop further with respect to Africa, in *Migration and Poverty in Africa: Is There a Link?*, Background Paper for the 1999 World Bank SPA Status Report on Poverty; drawing inter alia on Findley, op cit, 1997. Much earlier, Epstein's South Indian research developed the concept of a 'share families', units that live separately but have agreed to share the responsibility for their incomes as well as their expenditure, emphasising that the way family structures have evolved differs across economic classes; REF
- ⁷⁵ This was one of the key themes of the edited volume with Ben Rogaly, eds, *Labour Mobility and Rural Society*, Frank Cass, London, 2002.

⁷⁶ Adepaju, in the introduction to his edited volume on family, population and development in Africa, stated; “[m]igration is eroding day-to-day mutual support among family members...” (Adepaju, 1997, op cit., p.23). Others have suggested that the negative effects might have been overstated; for example Read in Malawi in 1942 and Watson in Zambia in 1958.

⁷⁷ Portes, A., and Sensenbrenner, ‘Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action’, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.98, No.6, 1993; Ben Rogaly, ‘Embedded Markets: Hired Labour Arrangements in West Bengal Agriculture’, *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol.25, No.2, 1997, pp.209-23; and ‘Workers on the Move: Seasonal Migration and Changing Social Relations in Rural India’, *Gender and Development*, Vol.6, No.1, 1998, pp.21-29.

⁷⁸ Wright, C., 1995, ‘Gender Awareness in Migration Theory: Synthesizing Actor and Structure in Southern Africa’, *Development and Change*, Vol.26, p.771; Chant, Sylvia and Sarah A. Radcliffe, 1992, ‘Migration and Development: The Importance of Gender’, in: S. Chant (ed.), *Gender and Migration in Developing Countries*, London etc.: Belhaven Press, pp.1-29; Sinclair, M.R. (1998). ‘Community, Identity and Gender in Migrant Societies of Southern Africa: Emerging Epistemological Challenges’, *International Affairs*, Vol.74, No.2, pp.339-53.

⁷⁹ D. Massey et al., ‘An Evaluation of International Migration Theory’, *Population and Development Review*, 20, 4, 1994, pp.699-751; a recent critique emphasises the role of power relations of employers’ demands and the middlemen involved within migration networks; F. Krissman, ‘Sin Coyote Ni Patrón: Why the “Migration Network” Fails to Explain International Migration’, *International Migration Review*, Vol.34, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.4-44.

⁸⁰ See for example Massey, D.S., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouchi, A. Pellegrino, J.E. Taylor, ‘Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal’, *Population and Development Review*, Vol.19, No.3, 1993, pp.451-54, regarding how international migration streams sustain themselves in cumulative fashion.

⁸¹ Safa, H.I., ed., 1982, *Towards a Political Economy of Urbanization in Third World Countries*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Jan Breman, *Footloose Labour. Working in India's Informal Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁸² Breman, Jan, *Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers: Rural Labour Circulation and Capitalist Production in West India*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985; R. Mansell Prothero and Murray Chapman (eds), *Circulation in Third World Countries*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

⁸³ Breman, Jan, *Labour Migration and Rural Transformation in Colonial Asia*, Comparative Asian Studies 5, Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990.

⁸⁴ For example, the historical-structural framework in H. Rubenstein, ‘Migration, Development and Remittances in Rural Mexico’, *International Migration*, Vol.30, No.2, 1992, pp.127-53. Also for example Kritiz, M.M. and H. Zlotnik, ‘Global interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies’, in: Kritiz, M.M., L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik, eds., *International Migration Systems. A Global Approach*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

⁸⁵ See for example information on migration highlighted in the OPPG case study on Ghana (McKay et al.); and Litchfield, J. and H. Waddington, *Migration and Poverty in Ghana: Evidence from the Ghana Living Standards Survey*, Sussex Migration Working Paper No.10, March 2003. Also, data gathered through support of the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute now provided detailed insight for five sending and three receiving countries; in Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2004, op cit.

⁸⁶ Exceptions include data on Vietnam; de Brauw, A. and T Harigaya, *Seasonal Migration and Improving Living Standards in Vietnam*, Mimeo, Williams College, September 2004.